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Abstract
This paper investigates the effectiveness of depositor discipline and its relationship with various
bank regulations and supervisions using a panel of about 17,000 bank-year data during 1992-2002
around 60 countries. We first theoretically show that bank regulations affect deposit interest rate
and its sensitivity to bank risk through the bank insolvency risk and the fraction of deposit protec-
tion, among others. Then we find empirical evidence that strict regulations on bank activities and
powerful supervisory authorities tend to reduce deposit interest rate and its sensitivity to bank risk,
suggesting that they tend to reduce market discipline by depositors.
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1. Introduction
A series of banking crises that occurred in the last two decades around the world have shown that
banking crises have systematic and disruptive effects on the financial system and the real economy as
well. To avoid or lessen the likelihood of a banking crisis and its negative impact on the economy, al-
most all of the countries in the world have regulated banks by restricting their activities and entry, im-
posing capital adequacy requirements, and supervising operations and management. Most countries have
financial safety net in place as well including explicit or implicit deposit insurance and resolution proce-
dures of insolvent banks.
Recent banking crises, however, have also shown that these government regulations and safety nets
have not successfully controlled bank risk-taking behavior. To maintain the safety and soundness of
banking system, the disciplinary role of private agents, market discipline, is attracting more and more at-
tention by policy-makers and expected to supplement bank regulations (e.g., Basel, 2003). Market disci-
pline in the banking sector can be described as a situation in which private sector agents including de-
??
Gakushuin Economic Papers, Vol.45, No.1, April 2008, Gakushuin University, Tokyo, Japan
? Gakushuin University
Corresponding author: Mejiro 1-5-1, Toshima-ku, Tokyo,171-8588, Japan.
Tel. +81-3-5992-4909 Fax. +81-3-5992-1007, email kaoru.hosono@gakushuin.ac.jp
? Development Bank of Japan
? Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry
positors, creditors, and stockholders face costs that are increasing in the risks undertaken by banks and
take action on the basis of these costs. For example, uninsured depositors, who are exposed to bank risk
taking, may penalize riskier banks by requiring higher interest rates or by withdrawing their deposits
(Martinez Peria and Schmukler (2001), p. 1030). Even insured depositors may respond to bank risk if
there is some uncertainty or costs involved with recovering deposits in the case of bank failure. A high
risk sensitivity of depositors implies that banks will be punished by paying higher deposit interest rate or
attracting smaller amounts of deposit if they take excessive risk-taking. Hence, depositors who are high-
ly sensitive to bank risk are likely to restrain banks’ excessive risk-taking behavior.
Despite growing emphasis on market discipline among policy makers, its effectiveness has not been
well examined empirically. Though there is growing literature on the effectiveness of market discipline
in the U.S. and some other countries (see the surveys by Flannery, 1998 and Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane,
2002), it is not yet well understood under what conditions market discipline works well. One important
exception is Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2003). They examined the effects of deposit insurance de-
signs on depositor discipline and found that explicit deposit insurance reduced depositor’s sensitivity to
bank risk and that the more it did as its coverage was broader.
This paper aims at providing new cross-country evidence on the relationship between various bank
regulations and depositor discipline. To increase depositors’ sensitivity to bank risk and enhance market
discipline, the proposed new capital adequacy framework (Basel II) focuses exclusively on disclosure. A
well-developed accounting, audit and rating system is arguably a necessary condition for effective mar-
ket discipline because without them, depositors would not be able to estimate bank risk accurately and
be responsive to its changes. Then, how should we understand the relationship between other banking
regulatory actions and depositor discipline? We theoretically show that depositors’ risk sensitivity de-
pends upon the probability of bank insolvency and the extent of deposit protection in the case of bank
insolvency. Bank regulations affect depositor discipline either through bank insolvency risk or depositor
protection.
Some bank regulations may successfully control bank risk, contribute to bank stability, and hence re-
duce depositors’ sensitivity to bank risk. We call this mechanism regulatory discipline in the sense that
regulatory authorities directly discipline banks. Dewatripont and Tirole (1994), among others, point out
that each depositor has little incentive or poor ability to monitor a bank due to the informational complex-
ity and free-ride problem. Based on these limitations to depositors’ ability to monitor and control bank
risk, they assert that regulatory authorities are supposed to act as a representative monitor of banks for the
sake of depositors by regulating banks. This “representative hypothesis” is consistent with regulatory dis-
cipline view. On the other hand, some regulations and safety nets shield depositors from bank insolvency
risk and losses, and thus reduce depositors’ sensitivity to bank risk, finally encouraging excessive risk tak-
ing on the side of banks. We call this mechanism regulatory shield. Regulatory shields may be generated
not only from explicit deposit insurance but also from bank regulations. Regulatory authorities may have
an incentive to protect and bail out incumbent banks since by giving benefits to incumbent banks, regula-
tors can extracts rents from them (“regulatory capture” hypothesis by Stigler (1971) or “tollbooth” hy-
pothesis by Shleifer and Vishny (1998) and Djankov et al. (2002)). In addition, regulators may not want
to lose their reputation as a supervisor (“reputation concern”, Boot and Thakor (1993)). Bank regulations
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may lower market discipline either through “regulatory discipline” or “regulatory shield.”
This paper complements Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2003) by examining broader conditions for
depositor discipline using a larger sample set (a panel of about 17,000 bank-year data during 1992-2002
across 60 countries). We investigate theoretically and empirically the effects of bank regulations and
safety nets on depositors’ sensitivity to bank risk. We measure depositor’s sensitivity to bank risk by the
magnitude of an increase in the risk premium of interest rates or a change in deposits outstanding re-
sponding to a marginal increase in bank risk as in most of the preceding studies including Demirgüç-
Kunt and Huizinga (2003). This paper also complements Kane and Klingebiel (2004), who examined
how policy actions undertaken at the outset of crises affected the damage of the crises on a country’s fi-
nancial sector and on its real economy, finding that the most important steps were market-mimicking ac-
tions that promptly estimated and allocated losses during the early stages of a crisis. We focus on the po-
tential role of market discipline in preventing crises, while they focus on ex-post policy actions to lessen
the damages of crises.
This paper is also related to Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004), abbreviated by BCL hereafter, who as-
sess bank regulations from the viewpoint of its effects on bank efficiency, performance or stability.?
We focus on the effects of bank regulations on market discipline rather than its overall effects on bank
performance.
In section 2, we present our theoretical models and working hypothesis concerning how bank regula-
tions and other institutional factors affect the risk sensitivity of deposit interest rates. Sections 3 and 4
describe our empirical methodology and data set, respectively. Section 5 presents our empirical results
on the risk sensitivity of deposit interest rate. Section 6 examines the risk sensitivity of deposit growth.
Section 7 concludes.
2. A Model of Depositor Discipline
In this section, we present a simple model to show how the deposit interest rate is affected by bank
risk and government policies.
We consider a one-period model in which a bank, risk-neutral depositors and the government exist.
The bank has an asset that is normalized to one at the beginning of period. It has initial capital of and
finances the remaining amount of by issuing deposits by promising the gross interest rate of . At
the end of the period, the value of asset turns out to be , whose cumulative distribution, , and its
density, , are known to everyone at the beginning of the period. Depositors incur a cost of if the
bank is insolvent. This may be interpreted as a verification cost that depositors incur to verify as in
Townsend (1979) and other costly state verification (CSV) models. It may also be interpreted as restitu-
tion cost that depositors incur in the case of bank insolvency due to the time and costs needed to recover
deposits as is stressed by Cook and Spellman (1994). If , then the bank is insolvent without
the government’s support. The government plays two roles. It affects by regulating banking activi-
ties. The government also protects depositors either by explicit deposit insurance or by implicit bailout
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? See also Cull, Senbet and Sorge (2005) for empirical evidence on the link between deposit insurance and financial sta-
bility and development.
policy. Suppose that the government pays in the case of insolvency after realizes. Whether the
government has to pay a verification cost or not does not matter here. is known to everyone at the
beginning of the period. There is a safe asset whose gross interest rate is .
We analyze the determination of deposit interest rate assuming that is predetermined. That is,
we analyze the situation after the bank determines its portfolio, (anticipating its effect on the deposit in-
terest rate) to focus on the depositors’ response to bank portfolio. We do not take up the free-ride prob-
lem associated with the depositors’ monitoring, either. This is not because we think that these problems
are unimportant but because our purpose here is to derive empirical implications that we can test. If the
free-riding problem is so severe that no depositor monitors bank risk, the deposit interest rate would be
insensitive to bank risk at all.
The expected return to one unit of deposits is
(1)
, where the first term is the expected return in the non-default region and the second term is that in the
default region. The arbitrage between the deposit and the safe asset implies that
(2)
The gross interest rate to deposits, , is determined by equation (2). If there are multiple solutions, we
assume that the lowest value is chosen. Considering that a lower deposit interest rate increases bank
profits, we think that this assumption is reasonable.
To make the analysis simple, we specify and . First we assume that the value of asset is
distributed uniformly on , so that
(3) .
A problem of the uniform distribution is that a higher implies a higher expected return and a higher
variance as well. However, affects the deposit interest rate mainly through the probability of insol-
vency. Note that the probability of insolvency is . A higher value of reduces the insolvency
risk and thereby the deposit interest rate as we see below. Next we assume that the government repays
depositors a fraction of of bank debt in the case of insolvency. That is,
(4)
If the government sets to be equal to one and equal to zero, it fully compensates depositors either
by an efficient blanket guarantee of deposit insurance or recapitalization to avoid bank failure. In this
case, is simply equal to . If the government sets less than one, we obtain by substituting
equations (3) and (4) into equation (2) as follows,
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(5)
In this section we analyze a situation where there is no credit rationing by assuming that there is a real
value of that satisfies equation (5). In section 6, we discuss the credit rationing case where depositors
respond to bank risk by adjusting deposit quantity. We obtain the following equilibrium value of :
(6)
From equation (6), it is straightforward to show that . Banks with a high initial capital faces a
low probability of insolvency and hence a low risk premium.
Now we proceed to analyze the effects of various bank regulations and other institutional factors on
the deposit interest rate and its sensitivity to bank capital. We consider that bank regulations and legal
environment affect the parameters and thereby the deposit interest rate and its sensitivity to
bank capital. One institutional factor may affect two or more of these parameters. Deposit insurance, for
example, would directly increase the proportion that the government pays to depositors, , but it may
also induce a bank’s excessive risk-taking behavior, leading to a high insolvency risk, that is, lower .
After analyzing the effect of each parameter on the deposit interest rate, we discuss the effect of each in-
stitutional factor on the deposit interest rate through the parameters.
Result 1: ,
A policy that tends to increase the capital ratio would not only decrease the deposit interest rate but also
its sensitivity to bank capital as is illustrated by Figure 1.
Result 2: and .
A policy that lowers the insolvency risk of banks would reduce the deposit interest rate and its sensitivi-
ty to bank equity.
Result 3: and 
The higher proportion the government compensates depositors’ losses in the case of bank insolvency,
the lower the deposit interest rate and its sensitivity to bank equity given the insolvency risk and other
parameters held constant.
Result 4: and 
In a country where the verification/restitution cost in the case of insolvency is low, the deposit interest
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and its sensitivity to bank capital are low.
So far, we have assumed that banks have no market power, as the expected rate of return on deposits
equals the alternative return to safe asset. It is easy to allow for a market power of banks. Suppose that
the bank has to pay the deposit interest rate so that its expected rate of return is , where a higher
indicates a stronger market power of the bank and hence a lower expected ruturn to its deposits.
Then, the following results hold.
Result 5: and 
If a bank has a strong market power in the deposit market, the deposit interest rate is low and its sensitiv-
ity to bank capital is also low.
Several points are noteworthy concerning our theoretical predictions. First, our results on the signs of the second-
order derivatives such as and certainly depend upon the distribution of the return, ,
though we believe that they hold for some distributions other than the uniform distribution. It should be noted,
however, that a similar prediction that credit constraints become tighter as net worth becomes smaller ( )
has been pointed out and tested using non-financial firms’ data by preceding studies (e.g., Bernanke, Gertler, and
Gilchrist, 1996; Hosono and Watanabe, 2002).
Second, a marginal increase in , , , and and a marginal decrease in decrease the probabili-
ty of insolvency, ,  given the other parameters constant, either directly (in the
case of ) or indirectly through a decrease in the deposit interest rate (in the case of all the parameters).
In practice, however, these parameters may depend upon each other. Especially, the parameter of insol-
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Figure 1. Bank equity and deposit interest rate
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vency risk, , represents the bank’s choice of asset portfolio, which is likely to be affected by the initial
capital ratio, , the degree of deposit protection, , and the restitution/verification costs, . Taking
this possibility into consideration, we discuss how various bank regulations affect these parameters and
thus deposit interest rate and its risk sensitivity below.
Finally, we do not consider that the government can fully control or precisely choose the parameters.
We do consider that the government regulations and legal environment can affect the parameters. For
example, depositors of a failed bank have to fill out forms to obtain their funds from the deposit insur-
ance agency after the bank failure. Though the government cannot control (or even measure) these resti-
tution costs, , deposit insurance design and legal quality would affect the restitution costs through the
bureaucratic delay and the credibility of deposit insurance.
A. Regulations on bank activities and banking-commerce links
Regulations on bank activities and banking-commerce links affect the sensitivity of deposit interest
rate to bank risk through two different channels. On one hand, regulations on bank activities affect bank
profitability and insolvency risk. Whether they reduce or increase bank profitability and risk is theoreti-
cally ambiguous. They may alleviate the conflicts of interest between banking and security underwrit-
ings, reduce the opportunities to engage in risky business such as real estate investment, and prevent
banks to be as powerful as to capture regulatory bodies. On the other hand, they may deprive banks of
the opportunities to diversify asset portfolios or to exploit economies of scope and scale, thus leading to
a high probability of bank failure. If regulations on bank activities effectively lower the probability of
bank failure, i.e, increase , deposit interest rate would be lower and less sensitive to bank risk, and
vice versa (Result 2).
On the other hand, regulations on bank activities are often implemented arbitrarily by regulatory bodies
and hence likely to lead to a forbearance policy. In that case, depositors are insensitive to bank risk since a
forbearance policy or a bailout policy will decrease the costs that depositors incur in the case of bank in-
solvency, leading to a higher and reducing deposit interest rate and its risk sensitivity (Result 3).
Therefore, if we find that regulations on bank activities tend to reduce deposit interest rate and its sen-
sitivity to bank equity, we cannot judge whether they effectively control bank risk or they are associated
with a forbearance policy, i.e. they affect the sensitivity from the route of or .
B. Regulations on capital adequacy
Minimum capital requirements tend to increase the average bank capital level and lower the insolven-
cy risk. Given other conditions unchanged, deposit interest rate would be lower and less sensitive to
bank risk as capital regulations become stricter (Result 1).
Capital requirements also affect the probability of insolvency by changing bank risk-taking behavior.
The effects of capital adequacy requirements on bank risk-taking behavior are theoretically ambiguous.
Merton (1977), among others, insist that capital requirements reduce bank risk taking under deposit in-
surance because the option value of deposit insurance decreases as leverage decreases. However, capital
requirements may change the scale of banks and also change the asset risk in ambiguous ways (see e.g.,
Koehn and Santomero, 1980)?. Moreover, as Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000) argue, if equity is
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more expensive than safe assets, capital requirements have a perverse effect of harming banks’ franchise
values, and hence they may encourage gambling. If capital requirements reduce bank risk-taking behav-
ior, they reduce the insolvency risk (i.e., increase ) and vice versa. Therefore, their effect on the level
and risk-sensitivity of deposit interest rate are also ambiguous (Result 2).
Having multiple capital zones as in the U.S.’s prompt corrective action may reduce greatly the moral
hazard problem of just one zone capital requirements. Because we do not have data on the number of
capital zones, we have to ignore this distinction, though it would make an important difference concern-
ing the effects of capital regulations on bank risk-taking and on depositors’ risk sensitivity.
C. Regulations on bank entry
Restrictions on bank entry tend to increase the monopolistic rents of the incumbent banks, leading to a
higher . In addition, regulations on bank entry may increase the market power of the bank, leading to a
higher . If banks respond to a large franchise value by prudent behavior, restrictions on bank entry will
further lower the probability of bank failure. On the other hand, a small number of large banks may be
easier to induce the government to implement a forbearance policy, leading to a higher . In any case,
deposit interest rate would be lower and less sensitive to bank risk under strong regulations on bank en-
try (Results 2, 3 and 5).
D. Deposit Insurance
Explicit deposit insurance reduces the losses that depositors incur in the case of bank insolvency, lead-
ing to a higher and thus lowering deposit interest rate and its sensitivity to bank risk (Result 3). On
the other hand, deposit insurance may induce a bank’s excessive risk-taking behavior, leading to a lower
and hence increasing deposit interest rate and its sensitivity to bank risk (Result 2).
Consequently, it is theoretically ambiguous whether explicit deposit insurance reduces or increases
the level and sensitivity of deposit interest rate to bank risk. Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2003) found
that explicit deposit insurance decreased the level and sensitivity of deposit interest rate to bank risk
measures and that this tendency was stronger for more generous deposit insurance, using a panel of
about 6500 bank-year data during 1990-97 around 52 countries. We extend sample countries and periods
to reexamine their results.
E. Supervision
Supervisory bodies have the authority to take specific actions to prevent and correct its risk taking be-
havior and the related undesirable outcome on the ground that outside private agents do not have infor-
mation or power necessary to control bank risk. In particular, prompt corrective action, i.e. a rule estab-
lishing pre-determined levels of bank solvency deterioration that forces automatic intervention, limits
excessive risk-taking and thus lower the probability of insolvency, leading to a higher . At the same
time, prompt corrective action also tends to reduce the problem of regulatory forbearance by inducing
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supervisors to be more proactive early on, leading to a lower . Thus, the effect of supervisory actions
on deposit interest rate and its risk sensitivity are theoretically ambiguous (Results 2 and 3).
Some supervisory actions are not taken under a pre-determined rule. To extract rents from the banking
industry, strong supervisors may use their discretional power to benefit the banking sector and are more
likely to bail out an insolvent bank and protect the depositors consequently, leading to a higher . This
effect, given other conditions unchanged, will make deposit interest rate lower and less sensitive to bank
risk (Result 3).
F. Accounting, disclosure, audit and ratings
In this subsection, we slightly change the above model to consider imperfect accounting and disclo-
sure. So far we have assumed that depositors exactly know the bank’s net worth, . However, in many
countries, accounting is far from complete. Depositors do not know precisely the bank’s net worth at
least for some time. Now we assume that depositors receive an imprecise signal of bank net worth and
infer the true net worth based on the signal.
Suppose that depositors know that a bank is a good bank that has a net worth of with the probabil-
ity of and that it is a bad bank that has a net worth of with the probability of . Without a
loss of generality, we assume that . Depositors receive a correct signal with the probability of 
and a wrong signal with the probability of for each type. If, for example, depositors receive a
good signal, the probability that the bank is really good is given by
(7)
The probability that the bank is bad though depositors receive a good signal is
(8)
The deposit interest rate for a bank with a good signal, denoted by , is determined by
(9)
, where is given by equation (5).
Substituting equations (7) and (8) into equation (9), we get
(10)
, where is the expected value of given the good signal:
(11)
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Similarly, the deposit interest rate for a bank with a bad signal, denoted by is determined by equation
(6), where is replaced by
(12)
Here we have assumed that the asymmetric information problem caused by the imperfect signal is not so
serious that it induces an adverse selection problem in the sense that good banks exit from the market.
Result 6. For 
For , and hence . In addition, we can show that the absolute value of is an in-
creasing function of . As the signal becomes accurate, the deposit interest rates determined based on the
signal approach to those determined based on the true value of capitals. Therefore, the sensitivity of the de-
posit interest rate to the true value of bank equity, , increases as the accounting and disclosure
develops and the signal becomes accurate (Figure 2). This is the route through which we expect disclosure
to enhance market discipline. The difference in deposit interest rates between good and bad banks may be
unlikely to be detected, however, if only imprecise signals are available to researchers as well.
G. Government ownerships of banks
Whether banks owned by government are more or less likely to engage in prudential management is
not theoretically clear. They may be more effectively controlled by regulatory bodies than privately-
owned banks, leading to a higher . On the other hand, they may be subject to a soft budget constraint
and hence tend to take excessive risk-taking, leading to a lower . Therefore, their impact on deposit in-
terest rate and its risk-sensitivity are also ambiguous (Result 2).
When government-owned banks become insolvent, they are more likely to be bailed out, leading to a
higher . In such a case, greater government ownership is associated with the lower value of deposit
interest rate and its lower risk sensitivity (Result 3).
H. Contract enforcement and protection of property rights
Strong enforcement of contracts and powerful protection of property rights are likely to reduce vari-
ous transaction costs associated with law enforcement for the protection of properties. In our theoretical
model, improvements in legal system tend to decrease the verification or restitution costs, , in the case of
bank insolvency. Such legal environment may also enable regulatory authorities to effectively control
banks, leading to a higher . As a result, deposit interest rate would be lower and less sensitive to bank
risk in a country with a high legal quality (Results 2 and 4).
3. Empirical Methodology
?e examine how institutional differences across countries affect depositors’ sensitivity to bank risk.
Pooling all the bank-year data across countries, we estimate the following equation using OLS, follow-
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ing Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2003):
(13)
, where the subscripts , , denote bank, country, and year index respectively.  is the average interest
rate on deposits adjusted by inflation rate. is a vector of the measures of bank risk and other bank charac-
teristics described below. We use one-period lagged values of Bank Fundamentals to take into account
that depositors know bank characteristics with a certain delay. We measure the average interest rates by
dividing total interests paid on deposits by deposits outstanding. If depositors respond to bank risk, the
coefficients on the inverse measures of bank risk characteristics in equation (13) are negative.
Bank fundamentals include a bank risk measure and other control variables. Bank risk is (inversely)
measured either by liquid assets (Liquidity), operating income (Profit), or equity (Equity), as a propor-
tion of total assets. Though our theoretical analysis developed in Section 2 focuses on bank equity as a
risk measure, we empirically examine a broader set of risk measures. These three accounting measures
are commonly used in preceding cross-country studies (e.g, Martinez-Peria and Schmukler, 2001;
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2003). Considering poor accounting practices of most developing coun-
tries, these preceding studies regard Liquidity as the best risk measure among the three. Demirgüç-Kunt
and Huizinga (2003) points out that Equity and Profit are subject to manipulation and tend to be over-
stated at weak banks. Controlling variables are overhead costs (OVERHEAD) as a proportion of total as-
sets, the logarithm of total assets to GDP (ASSETSIZE), and the ratio of customer and short-term fund-
ing to total interest bearing liability (MATURITY). ASSETSIZE may either lower or heighten the de-
posit interest rate. Depositors of a large bank may be protected implicitly by a “too-big-to-fail policy”
and hence require a low risk premium. If a large bank takes excessive risk under the too-big-to-fail poli-
cy, however, depositors would require a higher risk premium. MATURITY is added to the interest rate
equation to control for the difference in interest rates across deposits with different maturities.
denotes bank regulation and other institutional indexes that may affect deposit interest
rate and its risk sensitivity as is discussed in section 2. The interaction terms of and represent how insti-
tutional variables affect depositors’ sensitivity to bank risk. The following partial derivatives reveal this
point,
(14)
include inflation rate, growth rate of real per capita GDP, and govern-
ment bill rate adjusted by inflation rate.
There are two potential pitfalls or biases when we estimate equation (13) with OLS as is suggested by
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2003). First, Liquidity may be endogenous, because a risky bank may
hold more liquid assets to avoid higher interest rates. Suppose that a higher value of in equation (13)
first leads to a higher value of Interest Rate. This then leads to a higher value of Liquidity because of the
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possible endogeneity of this latter variable. This makes the coefficient on Liquidity less negative. So the
absolute value of the coefficient may be biased downwards. In addition, the deposit interest rate may be
correlated with Liquidity simply due to reserve requirements even without market discipline. Following
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, we deal with these problems by instrumenting for Liquidity using exoge-
nous influences on bank operations such as macro shocks and the Reserve rate defined by total bank re-
serves (at the macro level) divided by total bank deposits (at the macro level). Specifically, we perform a
two-stage regression where the first regression is as follows,
(15)
Then, we replace Liquidity by its predicted value as a regressor in equation (13).
The second problem is that we do not control for deposit growth in the deposit interest rate equation
(13), though market discipline works through both interest rate and deposit quantity adjustment. We esti-
mate the following equation for the growth rate of deposits outstanding, , and add its predict-
ed value to the regressors in equation (13):
(16)
In sum, as a robustness check, we estimate equation (13) with replaced by the predicted value of Liq-
uidity and the predicted value of added as a regressor.
One may be concerned about a possibility that a riskier bank may be willing to offer a higher deposit
interest rate and to increase its deposit and thus assets in order to undertake a gamble for resuscitation. If
this is the case, a positive correlation between deposit interest rates and bank risk measures does not nec-
essarily imply market discipline. However, there is another possibility that a riskier bank may be willing
to offer a lower interest rate and to decrease its deposit and thus assets in order to maintain its capital ra-
tio above the minimum requirement level. In this case, a positive correlation between deposit interest
rates and bank risk measures strongly suggests market discipline. Though we do not completely deal
with this kind of identification problem and its associated bias, like most of the preceding studies, we
will see later that there is no systemic correlation between deposit growth rates and bank risk measures,
suggesting that there seems to be no significant problem in estimating equation (13).
Another potential problem is that if deposit interest rates are regulated either explicitly or implicitly,
the coefficient on bank risk measures in equation (13) is likely to be underestimated, because depositors
who cannot require a sufficiently high risk premium are likely to withdraw deposits from a risky bank.
All of the countries in our sample had liberalized regulations on deposit interest rates before the sample
periods began as far as those countries that are examined in Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998,
Table 1). However, there may be still some kind of implicit restrictions on deposit interest rates. To take
this possibility into consideration, we estimate the growth rate of deposits in Section6.
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4. Data
4.1 Sample Selection and Bank-Level Variables
Our main data source of bank financial statements is BankScope compiled by Fitch IBCA. We select
countries that contain 20 banks or more. We exclude the bank-year samples that displayed 50% or more
growth rate of deposits because they are likely to have been involved with mergers or acquisitions. We
also exclude obvious data errors, including the samples that displayed -50 or less growth rate of de-
posits, that displayed no loan outstanding, and that displayed 100% or more absolute values of real de-
posit interest rate. We do not restrict sample banks to commercial banks but include savings banks, co-
operative banks, real estate mortgage banks, medium and long-term credit banks, non-banking credit in-
stitutions, specialized governmental credit institutions, and multi-lateral governmental banks. We are left
with 6222 banks across 60 countries. The sample covers the period of 1992-2002. The longest period in
a country is 11 years. The number of bank-year samples that we can use for our basic estimation is
26397, though the actual sample size that we use for estimation is smaller due to the limited availability
of institutional variables. The definitions of bank-level variables are given by Table 1. Deposit interest
rate is defined as the average interest rate of bank funding, i.e., the sum of “customer & short-term fund-
ing” and “other funding.” Though our definition is the same as in Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2003)
and includes bond interest rates, the ratio of “other funding” to “customer & short-term funding” is as
small as 6% on average. Descriptive sample statistics of bank-level variables are given by Table 2 by
country.
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Table 1. Definitions of Bank Data 
dependent variables  
Deposit Growth
Deposit Interest Rate
Bank risk variable 
Liquidity
Profit
Equity
Others 
Overhead
Shrot term debt / total debt
 
Asset size
Note 
1. Numbers in parentheses denote code numbers from BankScope 
2. GDP deflators are from International Financial Statistics by IMF. 
3. GDP deflators are replaced with CPI for Bahamas, Bulgaria, Kenya and Luxenburg due to data avaialbility. 
4. Nominal GDP is from World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
Definition
Rate of Change in Total Deposits (6080) / GDP Deflators 
Interest Expense (6250) / (Customer & Short Term Funding (2030) + Other
Funding (2035))- Rate of change in GDP deflators 
Definition 
Liquid Assets (2075) / Total Assets (2025) 
Operating Income (2190) / Total Assets (2025) 
Equity (2055) / Total Assets (2025) 
Definition 
Overheads (2090) / Total Assets (2025) 
Customer & Short Term Funding (2030) / (Total Liability (6290) - Non-
Interest-Bearing Liability (2040)) 
Logarithm of (Total Assets(2075)/Nominal GDP) 
??
Table 2. Bank Characteristics by Country 
 
 
AUSTRALIA
AUSTRIA
BAHAMAS
BANGLADESH
BELGIUM
BULGARIA
CANADA
CHILE
CHINA-PEOPLE’S REP.
COLOMBIA
COSTA RICA
CROATIA
CZECH REPUBLIC
DENMARK
DOMINICAN
EGYPT
FRANCE
GERMANY
GREECE
GUATEMALA
HONDURAS
HONG KONG
HUNGARY
INDIA
INDONESIA
IRELAND
ITALY
JAPAN
KENYA
KOREA REP. OF
LATVIA
LUXEMBOURG
MALAYSIA
MEXICO
NETHERLANDS
NIGERIA
NORWAY
PAKISTAN
PANAMA
PARAGUAY
PERU
PHILIPPINES
POLAND
PORTUGAL
ROMANIA
RUSSIAN
SINGAPORE
SLOVAKIA
SLOVENIA
SOUTH AFRICA
SPAIN
SWEDEN
SWITZERLAND
THAILAND
TUNISIA
TURKEY
UNITED KINGDOM
URUGUAY
USA
VENEZUELA
Deposit
growth
0.03
0.05
0.04
0.11
0.04
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.15
0.01
0.09
0.08
0.07
0.05
0.12
0.07
0.03
0.04
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.01
0.09
0.11
0.07
0.12
0.04
0.02
0.03
0.09
0.11
0.02
0.08
0.04
0.05
0.10
0.05
0.09
0.07
0.03
0.10
0.07
0.14
0.06
-0.09 
0.02
0.11
0.04
0.12
0.08
0.05
0.00
0.03
0.06
0.08
-0.17 
0.05
0.09
0.05
0.07
Interest
rate
0.05
0.02
0.05
0.03
0.03
-0.13 
0.03
0.02
0.02
-0.01 
0.01
-0.02 
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.05
0.03
0.02
0.01
-0.02 
0.06
-0.05 
0.02
-0.06 
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.04
0.04
-0.04 
0.04
0.02
0.10
0.04
-0.12 
0.01
0.00
0.05
0.13
0.01
-0.01 
0.00
0.00
-0.31 
-0.32 
0.04
0.04
-0.04 
0.02
0.00
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.05
-0.35 
0.03
0.18
0.02
-0.12 
Equity
0.07
0.06
0.16
0.04
0.07
0.17
0.08
0.18
0.10
0.13
0.20
0.19
0.07
0.13
0.10
0.07
0.06
0.09
0.09
0.07
0.13
0.19
0.11
0.06
0.07
0.09
0.12
0.05
0.13
0.05
0.10
0.06
0.08
0.13
0.08
0.12
0.08
0.07
0.09
0.17
0.12
0.16
0.12
0.06
0.21
0.17
0.13
0.05
0.13
0.11
0.10
0.05
0.14
0.08
0.15
0.12
0.11
0.10
0.09
0.15
Liquidity
0.07
0.15
0.44
0.21
0.16
0.46
0.05
0.26
0.30
0.14
0.29
0.24
0.22
0.23
0.27
0.16
0.11
0.32
0.34
0.17
0.23
0.34
0.08
0.35
0.14
0.22
0.34
0.20
0.35
0.12
0.10
0.45
0.21
0.24
0.31
0.53
0.06
0.38
0.26
0.42
0.19
0.28
0.11
0.11
0.19
0.39
0.19
0.39
0.15
0.17
0.16
0.17
0.22
0.15
0.12
0.45
0.28
0.23
0.08
0.34
Profit
0.03
0.04
0.07
0.03
0.03
0.10
0.03
0.07
0.03
0.11
0.08
0.08
0.06
0.05
0.09
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.05
0.07
0.08
0.04
0.08
0.04
0.05
0.02
0.04
0.02
0.10
0.03
0.08
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.03
0.14
0.04
0.04
0.03
0.10
0.09
0.06
0.06
0.03
0.14
0.09
0.03
0.07
0.06
0.08
0.04
0.03
0.05
0.02
0.05
0.10
0.04
0.10
0.05
0.14
OVERHEAD
0.02
0.02
0.04
0.02
0.02
0.08
0.02
0.04
0.01
0.09
0.06
0.05
0.05
0.04
0.07
0.01
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.06
0.06
0.02
0.05
0.03
0.03
0.01
0.03
0.02
0.06
0.02
0.08
0.01
0.02
0.05
0.02
0.09
0.02
0.03
0.02
0.10
0.08
0.04
0.04
0.02
0.07
0.06
0.01
0.04
0.04
0.05
0.03
0.02
0.03
0.02
0.02
0.07
0.02
0.08
0.03
0.10
MATURITY
0.86
0.88
0.97
1.00
0.92
0.98
0.98
0.90
0.87
0.91
1.00
0.87
0.95
0.95
0.86
0.96
0.89
0.95
0.99
0.80
0.88
0.90
0.92
0.97
0.81
0.97
0.80
0.97
0.97
0.84
0.98
0.92
0.99
0.95
0.87
0.99
0.82
0.98
0.96
0.96
0.98
0.97
0.99
0.85
0.99
0.97
0.99
0.97
0.95
0.91
0.94
0.64
0.84
0.88
0.81
0.95
0.96
0.98
0.89
0.99
ASSETSIZE
0.03
0.00
0.14
0.02
0.00
1.02
0.01
0.04
0.04
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.04
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.03
0.04
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.12
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.06
0.02
0.01
0.05
0.01
0.03
0.01
0.03
0.02
0.07
0.02
0.01
0.03
0.01
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.11
0.06
0.03
0.05
0.00
0.13
1.42
0.06
0.05
0.03
0.01
0.04
0.00
0.01
4.2 Institutional Variables
Bank regulation indexes are basically the same as those in BCL (2001, 2004), which is based on the
survey as of 1999 conducted by World Bank. These cover major fields of bank regulations: regulations
on capital adequacy index (CAPREG)?, regulations on bank activities and bank-commerce link index
(ACTREG), entry into banking requirements index (ENTRYREQ), official supervisory power index
(SPOWER), and private monitoring index (PMONITOR). We have excluded deposit insurance variables
from PMONITOR, which is the only difference from BCL (2001, 2004). Unfortunately, these regulatory
indexes are available only at 1999. We apply these values as of 1999 for all the sample period. We also
use the component variables of CAPREG, ACTREG and SPOWER to examine the relationship between
these regulations and market discipline in details.
Systemic banking crises often lead to drastic changes in the regulatory frameworks and the overall
banking stability as well, which in turn may change depositors’ risk sensitivity. Because our sample pe-
riod covers the pre- and post- Asian crises, our assumption that institutional variables were constant dur-
ing the whole sample period may cause a bias on depositors’ risk sensitivity. To check this possibility,
we conduct our estimation using only the period after 1999.
Deposit insurance generosity is measured by MORALHZARD, which is constructed using the princi-
pal component analysis of deposit insurance design features following Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache
(2002). Information on deposit insurance schemes is available only as of 1997, though information on
the foundation year of explicit deposit insurance is available. We also use the components of MORAL-
HAZARD.
In addition to the above regulatory variables, we use the share of government-owned banks (GOV-
BANK), contract enforcement index (CONTRACT), and property right index (FPROP). GOVBANK is
again the value at 1999. Among many institutional quality measures, we choose CONTRACT and
FPROP because they are most suitable to capture the restitution or verification costs in our model,
though the results do not seem to depend on the choice of specific variables.
The definitions of institutional variables and their descriptive sample statistics are shown by Tables 3
and 4, respectively. In Table 4A, we report the mean values of each variable over the sample period by
country. This is the reason why some dummy variables like TYPE take values between zero and one. In
Table 4B, we present pair-wise correlations among the institutional variables, showing that most of the
institutional variables are not significantly correlated with the following exceptions. First, GOVBANK
is negatively correlated with ENTRYREQ, PMONITOR, CONTRACT and FPROP and positively cor-
related with ACTREG. Second, ACTREG is negatively correlated with CONTRACT and FPROP, while
PMONITOR is positively correlated with CONTRACT and FPROP. Finally, CONTRACT and FPROP
are positively correlated with each other. The absolute values of correlation coefficients are mostly less
than 0.5 except for those between PMONITOR and FPROP and between CONTRACT and FPROP.
??
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? BCL (2004) and BCL (2001) are different in that the former assigns a value of one to “no” and zero to “yes,” while the
latter assigns one to “yes” and zero to “no” to the following questions: 1) Can assets other than cash or government se-
curities be used to increase capital?, and 2) Can borrowing funds be used? We follow BCL (2004).
??
Table 3. Definitions and Sources of Institutional and Macroeconomic Variables 
A. Bank Regulation Variables 
Variable
1. Capital regulatory variables 
(a) Overall capital stringency (OCAPREG)
(b) Initial capital stringency (ICAPREG)
(c) Capiral regulatory index (CAPREG)
2. Bank activity regulatory variables and mixing 
banking/commerce regulatory variables 
(a) Securities activities (SECURITY)
(b) Insurance activities (INSURANCE)
(c) Real estate activities (REAL ESTATE)
(d) Banks owning nonfinancial firms 
(NONFINANIAL) 
(e) Bank activity regulation index (ACTREG)
3. Compentition regulatory variables 
(a) Entry into banking requirements (ENTRYRE
4. Official supervisory action varaiables 
(a) Official supervisory power (SPOWER)
(1) Prompt corrective power (PCACT)
(2) Restructuring power (RPOWER)
(3) Declaring insolvency power (DINSOL)
5. Private monitoring variables 
(a) Certified audit required 
(b) Percent of 10 biggest banks rated 
internationally 
(c) Bank accounting 
Definition
 
Whether the capital requierement 
reflects certain risk elements and 
duducts certain market value losses 
from capital before minimum capital 
adequacy is determined.
Whether certain funds may be used to 
initially capitalize a bank and whether 
they are officiallly verified.
The sum of (a) and (b).
 
The extent to which banks may engage 
in underwriting, brokering, and dealing 
in securities, and all aspects of the 
mutual fund industry.
The extent to which banks may engage 
in insurance underwriting and selling. 
The extent to which banks may engage 
in real estate investment, development 
and management. 
The extent to which banks may own and 
control nonfinancial firms
The sum of (a) to (d).
 
Whether various types of legal 
submission are required to obtain a 
banking license. 
 
Whether the supervisory authorities 
havethe authority to take specific 
actions to prevent and correct problems. 
Whether the law establishes 
predetermined levels of bank solvency 
deterioration that force automatic 
actions, such as intervention. 
Whether the supevisory authorities have 
the power to restructure and reorganize 
a troubled bank. 
Whether the supevisory authorities have 
the power to declare a deeply troubled 
bank insolvent. 
Whether ther is a compuslry external 
audit by a licensed or certified auditor.
The percentage of the top ten banks 
that are rated by international credit 
rating agencies is 100% or less. 
Whether the income statement includes 
accrued or unpaid interest or principal 
Value 
 
Ranges from 0 to 6
Higher values indicate greater stringency 
Ranges from 0 to 3
Higher values indicate greater stringency
Ranges from 0 to 9
Higher values indicate greater stringency 
 
Ranges from 1 to 4
Higher values, more restrictive
Ranges from 1 to 4
Higher values, more restrictive 
Ranges from 1 to 4
Higher values, more restrictive
Ranges from 1 to 4
Higher values, more restrictive 
Ranges from 1 to 16
Higher values, more restrictive 
 
Ranges from 0 to 8
Higher values indicate greater stringency 
 
Ranges from 0 to 14
Higher value indicate greater power.
Ranges from 0 to 6
Higher value indicate greater power. 
corrective power. 
Ranges from 0 to 6
Higher value indicate greater power. 
Ranges from 0 to 2
Higher value indicate greater power.
Ranges from 0 to 1 
(percentage) 
Ranges from 0 to 3 HIgher value indicate 
more informative bank accounts. 
??
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Notes: Definition and quantification are identical to BCL (2004) with the exception of private monitoring index. 
            We exclude "no explicit deposit insurance scheme" from private monitoring index. 
            The above egulation variables are as of 1999. . 
            Data source is the World Bank questionare described by BCL (2001) 
(d) Private monitoring index (PMONITOR)
on nonperforming loans and whether 
banks are required to produce 
consolidated financial statements. 
Whether (a) occurs, (b) equals 100%, 
(c) occcurs, off-balance sheet items are 
disclosed to the public, banks must 
disclose risk management procedures 
to the public, and subordinated debt is 
allowable (required) as a part of 
regulatory capital 
Ranges from 0 to 6 Higher values 
indicate more private supervision.
B. Deposit insurance features 
???????Variable
(a) Insurace type (TYPE)
(b) No cocinsurance (COINSURE)
(c) Unlimited explicit coverage (LIMIT)
(d) Foreign currency deposits (FOREIGN)
(e) Interbank deposits (INTER)
( f ) Type of funding (FUNDTYPE)
(g) Source of funding (FUNDSOURCE)
(h) Management (MANAGE)
( i ) Membership (MEMBER)
( j ) Moral hazard (MORALHAZARD)
Definition are identical to Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002). Data source is Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002). 
???????????????Definition 
Implicit=0, Explicit=1 
Implicit=0, Insurance with coinsurance=1, Insurance without coinsurance=2 
Implicit=0, Insurance with coverage limit=1, Insurance without coverage limit=2 
Implicit=0, Insurance without coverage=1, Insurance with coverage=2 
Implicit=0, Insurance without coverage=1, Insurance with coverage=2 
Implciit=0, Unfunded=1, Funded=2 
Implicit=0, Bank=1, Both=2, Government=3 
Implicit=0, Private=1, Joint=2, Government=3 
Implicit=0, Compulsory=1, Voluntary=2 
First principle derived from pricinpal component analysis using (a) to (i). 
C. Bank concentration and legal quality variables 
???????Variable
Government bank share (GOVBANK)
Contract enforcability (CONTRACT)
Property rights (FPROP)
?????????????Definition and Source 
The percentage of banking system's assets in banks that are 50% or more
government owned a of 1999. Source: BCL (2001) 
The relative degree to which contractual agreements are honored and complica-
tions presented by language and mentality differences. Scored 0-4, with higher
scores for superior quality; average over 1980-95. Source: Knack and Keefer
(1995), using data from Business Environmental Risk Intelligence (BERI). 
Rating of property rights on a scale from 1 to 5. The more protection private proper-
ty receive the higher the score. Source: LLSV (1998), using data from 1997 Index
of Economic Freedom 
D. Macroeconomic variables 
???????Variable
Inflation Rate (INFLATION)
Real Percapita GDP Growth Rate (GROWTH)
Real Percapita GDP(GDP/cap)
Short-Term Government Bond Rate
(GOVERNMENT RATE)
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics and the World Bank, World Development Indicatiors. 
???????????????Definition 
Rate of change in GDP deflators 
Rate of change in real percapita GDP (US dollar) 
Per capita GDP at constant US dollar 
T-bill rate, discounr rate or bank rate- Rate of change in GDP deflators 
??
Table 4A. Institutional Characteristics by Country 
AUSTRALIA
AUSTRIA
BAHAMAS
BANGLADESH
BELGIUM
BULGARIA
CANADA
CHILE
CHINA-PEOPLE'S REP.
COLOMBIA
COSTA RICA
CROATIA
CZECH REPUBLIC
DENMARK
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
EGYPT
FRANCE
GERMANY
GREECE
GUATEMALA
HONDURAS
HONG KONG
HUNGARY
INDIA
INDONESIA
IRELAND
ITALY
JAPAN
KENYA
KOREA REP. OF
LATVIA
LUXEMBOURG
MALAYSIA
MEXICO
NETHERLANDS
NIGERIA
NORWAY
PAKISTAN
PANAMA
PARAGUAY
PERU
PHILIPPINES
POLAND
PORTUGAL
ROMANIA
RUSSIAN FEDERATION
SINGAPORE
SLOVAKIA
SLOVENIA
SOUTH AFRICA
SPAIN
SWEDEN
SWITZERLAND
THAILAND
TUNISIA
TURKEY
UNITED KINGDOM
URUGUAY
USA
VENEZUELA
ACTREG
8.00
5.00
      .
12.00  
9.00
10.00  
7.00
11.00  
14.00  
      .
      .
7.00
8.00
8.00
      .
13.00  
6.00
5.00
9.00
13.00  
9.00
      .
9.00
10.00  
14.00  
8.00
10.00  
13.00  
10.00  
9.00
8.00
6.00
10.00  
12.00  
6.00
9.00
      .
      .
8.00
      .
8.00
7.00
10.00  
9.00
13.00  
8.00
8.00
9.00
9.00
8.00
7.00
9.00
5.00
9.00
      .
12.00  
5.00
      .
12.00  
10.00  
ENTRYREQ
8.00
8.00
      .
6.00
8.00
8.00
8.00
3.00
6.00
      .
      .
7.00
8.00
8.00
      .
6.00
6.00
4.00
8.00
8.00
8.00
      .
7.00
6.00
7.00
7.00
8.00
6.00
8.00
7.00
      .
8.00
7.00
8.00
8.00
8.00
      .
      .
8.00
      .
8.00
7.00
7.00
7.00
8.00
8.00
      .
8.00
8.00
8.00
8.00
8.00
8.00
8.00
      .
7.00
8.00
      .
7.00
8.00
CAPREG
6.00
      .
      .
3.00
8.00
4.00
      .
5.00
      .
      .
      .
4.00
4.00
7.00
      .
5.00
      .
      .
4.00
4.00
5.00
.
7.00
7.00
5.00
      .
      .
7.00
6.00
6.00
      .
7.00
3.00
7.00
5.00
8.00
      .
      .
4.00
      .
6.00
4.00
6.00
5.00
      .
      .
      .
6.00
8.00
8.00
9.00
2.00
      .
5.00
      .
      .
6.00
      .
6.00
3.00
SPOWER
12.00  
14.00  
      .
11.00  
13.00  
      .
7.00
11.00  
10.00  
      .
      .
12.00  
13.00  
9.00
      .
13.00  
8.00
11.00  
10.00  
8.00
13.00  
      .
16.00  
9.00
14.00  
11.00  
6.00
13.00  
15.00  
10.00  
6.00
14.00  
11.00  
10.00  
8.00
13.00  
      .
      .
13.00  
      .
14.00  
12.00  
12.00  
13.00  
9.00
8.00
3.00
      .
16.00  
4.00
10.00  
6.00  
13.00  
11.00  
      .
11.00  
12.00  
      .
14.00  
14.00  
PMONITOR
8.00
      .
      .
      .
5.00
6.00
7.00
      .
5.00
      .
      .
      .
      .
6.00
      .
6.00
      .
      .
5.00
4.00
      .
      .
      .
      .
      .
6.00
      .
7.00
3.00
      .
      .
6.00
7.00
      .
6.00
5.00
      .
      .
      .
      .
6.00
6.00
6.00
7.00
5.00
      .
      .
4.00
5.00
      .
7.00
      .
7.00
5.00
      .
5.00
      .
      .
7.00
5.00
MORALHAZARD
-3.99 
0.57
      .
1.58
1.69
1.62
2.14
1.55
-3.99 
1.86
-3.99 
0.50
1.17
1.69
1.96
      .
0.58
0.59
1.21
      .
      .
-3.99 
1.69
1.98
-3.99 
1.16
1.27
1.89
2.53
1.01
-0.05 
0.17
-3.99 
3.15
1.56
2.14
1.40
-3.99 
-3.99 
      .
1.69
2.53
1.31
1.56
1.69
-3.99 
-3.99 
1.54
      .
-3.99 
1.69
1.83
0.88
-3.99 
      .
2.60
0.17
      .
2.53
1.58
GOVBANK 
0.00
4.10
      .
69.86  
      .
17.60  
0.00
11.70  
      .
      .
      .
36.99  
19.00  
0.00
      .
66.60  
      .
42.00  
13.00  
7.61
1.10
      .
2.50
80.00  
44.00  
      .
17.00  
1.15
      .
29.70  
      .
5.03
0.00
25.00  
5.90
13.00  
      .
      .
11.56  
      .
2.50
12.12  
43.70  
20.80  
70.00  
68.00  
0.00
25.80  
39.60  
0.00
0.00
0.00
15.00  
30.67  
      .
35.00  
0.00
      .
0.00
4.87
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Table 4A. Institutional Characteristics by Country (Continued)
AUSTRALIA
AUSTRIA
BAHAMAS
BANGLADESH
BELGIUM
BULGARIA
CANADA
CHILE
CHINA-PEOPLE’S REP.
COLOMBIA
COSTA RICA
CROATIA
CZECH REPUBLIC
DENMARK
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
EGYPT
FRANCE
GERMANY
GREECE
GUATEMALA
HONDURAS
HONG KONG
HUNGARY
INDIA
INDONESIA
IRELAND
ITALY
JAPAN
KENYA
KOREA REP. OF
LATVIA
LUXEMBOURG
MALAYSIA
MEXICO
NETHERLANDS
NIGERIA
NORWAY
PAKISTAN
PANAMA
PARAGUAY
PERU
PHILIPPINES
POLAND
PORTUGAL
ROMANIA
RUSSIAN FEDERATION
SINGAPORE
SLOVAKIA
SLOVENIA
SOUTH AFRICA
SPAIN
SWEDEN
SWITZERLAND
THAILAND
TUNISIA
TURKEY
UNITED KINGDOM
URUGUAY
USA
VENEZUELA
CONTRACT
3.04
3.30
      .
      .
3.27
      .
3.27
2.42
      .
1.93
      .
      .
      .
3.27
      .
2.08
2.46
3.39
2.33
      .
      .
      .
      .
1.94
1.73
3.16
2.06
3.12
2.14
2.20
      .
      .
2.28
1.83
3.27
1.66
3.44
1.66
      .
      .
1.73
1.81
      .
1.91
      .
      .
3.17
      .
      .
2.70
2.56
3.31
3.59
2.23
      .
1.99
3.42
      .
3.54
1.69
FPROP
5.00
5.00
5.00
2.00
5.00
      .
5.00
5.00
      .
3.00
3.00
      .
      .
5.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
4.00
3.00
3.00
5.00
      .
3.00
3.00
5.00
4.00
5.00
3.00
5.00
      .
5.00
4.00
3.00
5.00
3.00
5.00
4.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
4.00
      .
4.00
      .
      .
5.00
      .
      .
3.00
4.00
4.00
5.00
5.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
4.00
5.00
3.00
RPOWER
3.00
3.00
      .
3.00
3.00
3.00
1.00
3.00
3.00
      .
      .
2.00
3.00
1.00
      .
2.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
      .
3.00
2.00
2.00
3.00
2.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
      .
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
      .
      .
3.00
      .
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
      .
0.00
3.00
0.00
3.00
2.00
3.00
3.00
      .
3.00
3.00
      .
3.00
3.00
DINSOL
1.00
1.00
      .
0.00
      .
2.00
1.00
2.00
      .
      .
      .
2.00
2.00
2.00
      .
1.00
0.00
2.00
2.00
1.00
2.00
      .
2.00
0.00
2.00
1.00
1.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
      .
1.00
2.00
2.00
1.00
2.00
      .
      .
2.00
      .
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
1.00
      .
2.00
2.00
1.00
1.00
0.00
1.00
2.00
      .
2.00
1.00
      .
2.00
2.00
PCACT
0.00
6.00
      .
0.00
      .
      .
0.00
3.00
0.00
      .
      .
4.00
5.00
2.00
      .
6.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
3.00
5.00
      .
6.00
0.00
6.00
0.00
0.00
6.00
6.00
4.00
0.00
0.00
2.00
3.00
0.00
5.00
      .
      .
0.00
      .
4.00
6.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
2.00
0.00
      .
6.00
0.00
3.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
      .
0.00
0.00
      .
5.00
5.00
ICAPREG
1.00
3.00
      .
2.00
2.00
3.00
2.00
2.00
3.00
      .
      .
2.00
3.00
1.00
      .
2.00
1.00
1.00
2.00
2.00
3.00
      .
3.00
2.00
3.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
3.00
1.00
      .
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
3.00
      .
      .
2.00
      .
1.00
1.00
2.00
1.00
3.00
      .
      .
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
1.00
1.00
2.00
      .
1.00
1.00
      .
2.00
1.00
OCAPREG
5.00
      .
      .
1.00
6.00
1.00
      .
3.00
      .
      .
      .
2.00
1.00
6.00
      .
3.00
      .
      .
2.00
2.00
2.00
      .
4.00
5.00
2.00
      .
      .
4.00
3.00
5.00
      .
5.00
1.00
5.00
3.00
5.00
      .
      .
2.00
      .
5.00
3.00
4.00
4.00
      .
4.00
5.00
3.00
5.00
5.00
6.00
1.00
      .
3.00
      .
      .
5.00
      .
4.00
2.00
??
Table 4A. Institutional Characteristics by Country (Continued)
AUSTRALIA
AUSTRIA
BAHAMAS
BANGLADESH
BELGIUM
BULGARIA
CANADA
CHILE
CHINA-PEOPLE’S REP.
COLOMBIA
COSTA RICA
CROATIA
CZECH REPUBLIC
DENMARK
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
EGYPT
FRANCE
GERMANY
GREECE
GUATEMALA
HONDURAS
HONG KONG
HUNGARY
INDIA
INDONESIA
IRELAND
ITALY
JAPAN
KENYA
KOREA REP. OF
LATVIA
LUXEMBOURG
MALAYSIA
MEXICO
NETHERLANDS
NIGERIA
NORWAY
PAKISTAN
PANAMA
PARAGUAY
PERU
PHILIPPINES
POLAND
PORTUGAL
ROMANIA
RUSSIAN FEDERATION
SINGAPORE
SLOVAKIA
SLOVENIA
SOUTH AFRICA
SPAIN
SWEDEN
SWITZERLAND
THAILAND
TUNISIA
TURKEY
UNITED KINGDOM
URUGUAY
USA
VENEZUELA
TYPE
0.00
1.00
      .
1.00
1.00
0.99
1.00
1.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
0.79
1.00
1.00
1.00
      .
1.00
1.00
0.99
      .
      .
0.00
1.00
1.00
0.45
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.83
0.66
1.00
0.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.00
0.00
      .
1.00
1.00
0.95
1.00
1.00
0.00
0.00
0.97
      .
0.00
1.00
0.98
1.00
0.71
      .
1.00
1.00
      .
1.00
1.00
COINSURE
0.00
1.00
      .
2.00
2.00
1.98
2.00
1.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
1.58
1.00
2.00
1.00
      .
2.00
1.00
1.97
      .
      .
0.00
2.00
2.00
0.00
1.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
1.65
1.32
1.00
0.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
0.00
0.00
      .
2.00
2.00
0.95
1.00
2.00
0.00
0.00
1.95
      .
0.00
2.00
1.95
2.00
0.00
      .
2.00
1.00
      .
2.00
2.00
LIMIT
0.00
1.00
      .
1.00
1.00
0.99
1.00
1.00
0.00
1.86
0.00
0.79
1.00
1.00
1.00
      .
1.00
1.00
0.99
      .
      .
0.00
1.00
1.00
0.90
1.00
1.00
1.96
1.00
1.47
0.66
1.00
0.00
2.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.00
0.00
      .
1.00
1.00
0.95
1.00
1.00
0.00
0.00
0.97
      .
0.00
1.00
0.98
1.00
1.41
      .
2.00
1.00
      .
1.00
1.00
FOREIGN
0.00
2.00
      .
1.00
2.00
1.98
1.00
2.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
1.58
1.00
2.00
2.00
      .
2.00
2.00
1.97
      .
      .
0.00
2.00
2.00
0.00
2.00
2.00
1.00
2.00
0.83
1.32
2.00
0.00
2.00
2.00
1.00
2.00
0.00
0.00
      .
2.00
2.00
1.91
2.00
2.00
0.00
0.00
1.95
      .
0.00
2.00
1.95
1.00
0.00
      .
2.00
2.00
      .
2.00
1.00
INTERBANK
0.00
1.00
      .
1.00
1.00
0.99
2.00
1.00
0.00
2.00
0.00
0.79
1.00
1.00
1.00
      .
1.00
1.00
0.99
      .
      .
0.00
1.00
1.00
0.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
2.00
0.83
0.66
1.00
0.00
2.00
1.00
2.00
1.00
0.00
0.00
      .
1.00
2.00
0.95
1.00
1.00
0.00
0.00
0.97
      .
0.00
1.00
0.98
1.00
0.00
      .
1.00
1.00
      .
2.00
1.00
FUNDTYPE
0.00
1.00
      .
2.00
2.00
1.98
2.00
1.00
0.00
2.00
0.00
1.58
2.00
2.00
2.00
      .
1.00
2.00
1.97
      .
      .
0.00
2.00
2.00
0.00
2.00
1.00
2.00
2.00
1.65
1.32
1.00
0.00
2.00
1.00
2.00
2.00
0.00
0.00
      .
2.00
2.00
1.91
2.00
2.00
0.00
0.00
1.95
      .
0.00
2.00
1.95
1.00
0.00
      .
2.00
1.00
      .
2.00
2.00
FUNDSOURCE
0.00
2.00
      .
2.00
2.00
1.98
2.00
3.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
1.58
2.00
2.00
2.00
      .
1.00
1.00
0.99
      .
      .
0.00
2.00
2.00
0.00
1.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
1.65
1.32
1.00
0.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
0.00
0.00
      .
2.00
2.00
1.91
2.00
2.00
0.00
0.00
1.95
      .
0.00
2.00
1.95
1.00
0.00
      .
2.00
1.00
      .
2.00
2.00
MANAGE
0.00
1.00
      .
3.00
2.00
1.98
3.00
3.00
0.00
3.00
0.00
1.58
3.00
2.00
2.00
      .
1.00
1.00
1.97
      .
      .
0.00
2.00
3.00
0.00
3.00
2.00
2.00
3.00
2.48
1.98
1.00
0.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
1.00
0.00
0.00
      .
2.00
3.00
2.86
3.00
2.00
0.00
0.00
1.95
      .
0.00
2.00
2.93
1.00
0.00
      .
3.00
1.00
      .
3.00
3.00
MEMBER
0.00
1.00
      .
1.00
1.00
0.99
1.00
1.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
0.79
1.00
1.00
2.00
      .
1.00
1.00
0.99
      .
      .
0.00
1.00
1.00
0.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.83
0.66
1.00
0.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.00
0.00
      .
1.00
1.00
0.95
1.00
1.00
0.00
0.00
0.97
      .
0.00
1.00
0.98
2.00
0.00
      .
1.00
1.00
      .
1.00
1.00
5. Estimation Results of Deposit Interest Rate
5.1 Baseline Results
Table 5 shows the estimation results of deposit interest rate (Equation 13). We organize the discussion
below for each institutional variable by focusing on the interaction terms of bank risk measures and in-
stitutional variables. Before discussing the effects of bank regulations on market discipline, however, we
briefly look at the control variables based mainly on the results for Liquidity as a risk measure. We do
not report the coefficients on the control variables except for the case of ACTREG in Table 5 to save
space.
The coefficients on Liquidity are negative and significant for all the specifications except for the cases
of ENTRYREQ and PMONITOR. This result suggests that market discipline works to some degree in
many countries.? Most of the coefficients on Profit and Equity are also negative, but the significance
levels are somewhat lower especially in the case of Equity, probably reflecting its poor accuracy.
Among the bank characteristics variables, most of the coefficients on OVERHEAD are not signifi-
cant, though they are significantly negative when CONTRACT is used as an institutional variable. A
negative coefficient on OVERHEAD may suggest that banks with lower overhead costs provide deposi-
tors with less convenient service and have to pay higher interest rates (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga,
2003), though such a relationship is not robust. MATURITY, i.e., the ratio of short-term debt to total
debt, has a significantly negative coefficient in all the specifications, suggesting that the interest rate of
short-term debt is lower than that of long-term debt. ASSETSIZE has a significantly positive coefficient,
suggesting that a relatively large bank has to pay a high deposit interest rate.
Looking at macroeconomic variables, INFLATION has a significantly negative coefficient in all the
specifications, suggesting that nominal deposit interest rate does not change one to one to the inflation
rate, because the dependent variable is the real deposit interest rate. RATE has significantly positive co-
??
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Table 4B. Correlations Among Institutional Variables 
ACTREG
CAPREG
ENYRYREQ
MORALHAZARD
SPOWER
PMONITOR
GOVBANK
CONTRACT
FPROP
**,* indicate statistical significance levels of 5 and 10 percent,respectively.
ACTREG
1.00
-0.15 
-0.21 
0.00
0.06
-0.31 
   0.36**
  -0.48**
  -0.47**
CAPREG
 
1.00
0.11
0.13
0.11
0.06
-0.06
0.13
0.22
ENYRYREQ
 
1.00
-0.05 
-0.03 
-0.24 
  -0.31**
0.03
-0.09 
MORALHAZARD
 
1.00
0.23
-0.19 
0.01
0.03
-0.04 
SPOWER
 
1.00
-0.07 
0.02
-0.21 
-0.08 
PMONITOR
 
1.00
  -0.40**
   0.44**
   0.52**
GOVBANK
 
1.00
  -0.43**
  -0.41**
CONTRACT
 
1.00
   0.77**
FPROP
 
1.00
? We estimate the interest rate equation without institutional variables and its interaction terms for individual countries
using within estimator. These results are consistent with the cross-country ones reported in the main tables. See
Hosono, Iwaki and Tsuru (2004) for the country-by-country estimation results
??
Table 5. Deposit Interest Rate, Market Discipline, and Institutions 
***,**,* indicate statistical significance levels of 1,5 and 10 percent,respectively. 
Dependent variable is the ratio of interest expense to interest-paying debt, deflated by GDP deflator. 
P-values are in parentheses under the estimated coefficients, using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors from
an OLS regression.
A. ACTREG
Constant
 
Bank risk
 
OVERHEAD
 
MATURITY
 
ASSETSIZE
 
GOVERNMENT RATE
 
INFLATION
 
GROWTH
 
DEPOSIT GROWTH (Predicted value)
 
ACTREG
 
Bank risk x
ACTREG
No. of obs.
Adj. R-square
F value
Liquidity         
0.072
(.000)
-0.043
(.000)
-0.008
(.575)
-0.020
(.000)
0.001
(.000)
0.362
(.000)
-0.562
(.000)
0.061
(.028)
 
-0.002
(.000)
0.003
(.001)
16617
0.67
331.2
***
 
***
 
 
***
 
***
 
***
 
***
 
**
 
***
 
***
 
***
Profit           
0.075
(.000)
-0.296
(.000)
0.078
(.081)
-0.022
(.000)
0.001
(.000)
0.358
(.000)
-0.571
(.000)
0.064
(.015)
 
-0.003
(.000)
0.023
(.000)
17124
0.67
371.9
***
 
***
 
*
 
***
 
***
 
***
 
***
 
**
 
 
***
 
***
 
***
Equity           
0.068
(.000)
-0.012
(.558)
-0.018
(.487)
-0.023
(.000)
0.001
(.000)
0.357
(.000)
-0.573
(.000)
0.062
(.016)
 
-0.002
(.000)
0.003
(.339)
17123
0.67
329.2
***
***
***
***
***
**
***
***
Predicted value          
of Liquidity           
0.056
(.000)
-0.225
(.000)
-0.323
(.000)
0.007
(.074)
-0.001
(.000)
0.275
(.000)
-0.517
(.000)
-0.952
(.000)
0.851
(.000)
-0.003
(.001)
0.012
(.020)
6598
0.73
290.6
***
 
***
 
***
 
*
 
***
 
***
 
***
 
***
 
***
 
***
 
**
B. CAPREG
 
Bank risk
 
CAPREG
 
Bank risk x
CAPREG
No. of obs.
Adj. R-square
F value
Liquidity         
-0.038
(.007)
-0.001
(.047)
0.006
(.012)
9988
0.74
1102.1
***
 
**
 
**
***
Profit           
-0.264
(.185)
-0.001
(.409)
0.040
(.255)
10035
0.73
875.1 ***
Equity           
-0.066
(.093)
-0.001
(.262)
0.015
(.014)
10035
0.73
950.5
*
**
***
Predicted value          
of Liquidity           
0.083
(.009)
0.006
(.000)
-0.030
(.000)
3580
0.85
281.5
***
***
***
***
??
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***,**,* indicate statistical significance levels of 1,5 and 10 percent,respectively. 
Dependent variable is the ratio of interest expense to interest-paying debt, deflated by GDP deflator. 
P-values are in parentheses under the estimated coefficients, using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors from
an OLS regression. 
C. ENTRYREQ 
 
Bank risk
 
ENTRYREQ
 
Bank risk x
ENTRYREQ
No. of obs.
Adj. R-square
F value
Liquidity         
-0.004
(.719)
-0.001
(.012)
-0.001
(.529)
16490
0.67
324.3
 
 
**
 
 
 
 
 
***
Profit           
0.192
(.215)
-0.0001
(.860)
-0.032
(.017)
16997
0.66
328.9
 
 
 
 
**
 
 
 
***
Equity           
0.104
(.243)
-0.0001
(.908)
-0.014
(.181)
16997
0.66
340.3
Predicted value          
of Liquidity           
-0.472
(.000)
-0.013
(.000)
0.052
(.000)
6542
0.73
272.2
***
 
***
 
***
 
 
 
***
D. MORALHAZARD 
 
Bank risk
 
MORALHAZARD
 
Bank risk x
MORALHAZARD
No. of obs.
Adj. R-square
F value
Liquidity         
-0.022
(.000)
-0.004
(.000)
0.009
(.000)
17240
0.61
295.6
***
 
***
 
***
 
 
 
***
Profit           
-0.127
(.000)
-0.004
(.000)
0.043
(.000)
17743
0.61
314.3
***
 
***
 
***
 
 
 
***
 
 
***
 
***
 
 
 
***
Equity           
0.005
(.696)
-0.004
(.000)
0.014
(.002)
17741
0.61
304.8
Predicted value          
of Liquidity           
-0.096
(.000)
-0.002
(.041)
0.001
(.817)
6813
0.62
528.1
***
 
**
 
 
 
 
 
***
E. SPOWER 
 
Bank risk
 
SPOWER
 
Bank risk x
SPOWER
No. of obs.
Adj. R-square
F value
Liquidity         
-0.086
(.000)
-0.004
(.000)
0.006
(.000)
16561
0.66
359.7
***
 
***
 
***
 
 
 
***
Profit           
-0.485
(.000)
-0.004
(.000)
0.033
(.000)
17068
0.66
381.4
***
 
***
 
***
 
 
 
***
*
 
***
 
**
 
 
 
***
Equity           
-0.041
(.095)
-0.003
(.000)
0.006
(.021)
17067
0.66
379.9
Predicted value          
of Liquidity           
-0.380
(.000)
-0.005
(.000)
0.024
(.000)
6598
0.73
253.2
***
 
***
 
***
 
 
 
***
??
F. PMONITOR 
 
Bank risk
 
PMONITOR
 
Bank risk x
PMONITOR
No. of obs.
Adj. R-square
F value
Liquidity         
0.008
(.717)
-0.007
(.000)
-0.004
(.205)
9223
0.87
1017.5
 
 
***
 
 
 
 
 
***
Profit           
-0.511
(.002)
-0.010
(.000)
0.071
(.005)
9261
0.87
853.8
***
 
***
 
***
 
 
 
***
 
 
***
 
*
 
 
 
***
Equity           
-0.141
(.175)
-0.009
(.000)
0.026
(.096)
9261
0.87
889.7
Predicted value          
of Liquidity           
0.079
(.357)
0.0002
(.931)
-0.016
(.254)
3710
0.89
465.9
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
***
G. GOVBANK 
 
Bank risk
 
GOVBANK
 
Bank risk x
GOVBANK
No. of obs.
Adj. R-square
F value
Liquidity         
-0.009
(.000)
0.0004
(.000)
-0.0002
(.179)
14294
0.73
341.6
***
 
***
 
 
 
 
 
***
Profit           
-0.021
(.142)
0.0005
(.000)
-0.005
(.000)
14788
0.73
324.9
 
 
***
 
***
 
 
 
***
***
 
***
 
 
 
 
 
***
Equity           
0.037
(.004)
0.0004
(.000)
-0.001
(.102)
14787
0.73
347.0
Predicted value          
of Liquidity           
-0.084
(.000)
0.000
(.211)
0.002
(.041)
5757
0.82
271.4
***
 
 
 
**
 
 
 
***
H. CONTRACT 
 
Bank risk
 
CONTRACT
 
Bank risk x
CONTRACT
No. of obs.
Adj. R-square
F value
Liquidity         
-0.103
(.000)
-0.016
(.000)
0.029
(.000)
16113
0.62
751.8
***
 
***
 
***
 
 
 
***
Profit           
-0.527
(.000)
-0.015
(.000)
0.149
(.000)
16620
0.62
778.8
***
 
***
 
***
 
 
 
***
**
 
***
 
***
 
 
 
***
Equity           
-0.095
(.018)
-0.012
(.000)
0.043
(.001)
16619
0.61
732.3
Predicted value          
of Liquidity           
-0.307
(.000)
-0.018
(.000)
0.078
(.000)
6486
0.74
298.3
***
 
***
 
***
 
 
 
***
efficients with less than one. Deposit interest rate partially reflects the government rate. The signs of the
coefficients on GROWTH are mixed.
Now we turn to the effects of bank regulations and other institutional factors on the risk sensitivity of
deposit interest rate by focusing on our variables of interest: the interaction terms of institutional vari-
ables and bank risk measures. The estimation results not reported in tables are available from the author
upon request.
A. Regulations on bank activities and banking-commerce links
Panel A of Table 5 indicates that the interaction terms of ACTREG and bank risk measures are signif-
icantly positive, except for the case when EQUITY is used as a risk measure, suggesting that strict regu-
lations on bank activities tend to reduce the risk sensitivity of deposit interest rate. In addition, the coef-
ficients of ACTREG are significantly negative regardless of the risk measures. Strict restrictions on bank
activities tend to reduce the deposit interest rate. Our theoretical analysis suggests that restricting bank
regulations reduces either bank insolvency risk (regulatory discipline) or depositors’ losses in the case of
bank insolvency (regulatory shield).
We decompose ACTREG into 4 components and find strong evidence that restricting securities activi-
ties and real estate activities, in particular, reduce deposit interest rate and its risk sensitivity (not report-
ed).
B. Regulations on capital adequacy
The evidence on the relationship between capital adequacy regulations and the risk sensitivity of de-
posit interest is mixed (Panel B of Table 5). Though the interaction terms of CAPREG with Liquidity
and Equity are both significantly positive, suggesting a dampening effect on the risk sensitivity of de-
posit interest rate, the interaction term of CAPREG with Profit is not significant and its interaction term
with the predicted value of Liquidity is significantly negative. The latte result suggests an enhancing ef-
??
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***,**,* indicate statistical significance levels of 1,5 and 10 percent,respectively. 
Dependent variable is the ratio of interest expense to interest-paying debt, deflated by GDP deflator. 
P-values are in parentheses under the estimated coefficients, using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors from
an OLS regression. 
I. FPROP 
 
Bank risk
 
FPROP
 
Bank risk x
FPROP
No. of obs.
Adj. R-square
F value
Liquidity         
-0.120
(.000)
-0.016
(.000)
0.024
(.000)
16787
0.59
724.2
***
 
***
 
***
 
 
 
***
Profit           
-0.604
(.000)
-0.016
(.000)
0.120
(.000)
17294
0.59
735.6
***
 
***
 
***
 
 
 
***
 
 
***
 
*
 
 
 
***
Equity           
-0.076
(.242)
-0.012
(.000)
0.023
(.069)
17292
0.59
702.6
Predicted value          
of Liquidity           
-0.287
(.000)
-0.013
(.000)
0.044
(.000)
6723
0.73
292.5
***
 
***
 
***
 
 
 
***
fect on the risk sensitivity of deposit interest rate.
The mixed evidence on CAPREG may reflect the two conflicting theoretical hypotheses concerning
the effects of capital regulations on bank risk-taking. BCL (2004) investigated the effects of bank regula-
tions on bank efficiency and fragility. They obtained mixed results on the relationship between capital
regulations and the likelihood of a systemic bank crisis, suggesting that strict capital regulations do not
necessarily reduce the probability of bank insolvency. Their results are consistent with our findings.
We decompose CAPREG into the overall capital stringency index (OCAPREG) and the initial capital
stringency index (ICAPREG) and examine their effects on the risk sensitivity of deposit interest rate. We
find that the results for ICAPREG are consistent, suggesting that stringent initial capital regulations tend to
lower deposit interest rate and its risk sensitivity, while the results for OCAPREG are mixed (not reported).
C. Regulations on bank entry
We do not find a robust relationship between strict entry requirements and the risk sensitivity of de-
posit interest rate (Panel C of Table 5). Strict entry requirements do not seem to systematically affect the
risk sensitivity of deposit interest rate through bank insolvency risk or depositors’ losses in the case of
insolvency.
D. Deposit insurance designs
Though generous deposit insurance is often asserted to reduce the risk sensitivity of deposit interest
rate, the results for MORALHAZARD are somewhat mixed (Panel D of Table 5). While the simple OLS
regression results suggest that generous deposit insurance tends to weaken the risk sensitivity of deposit
interest rate, the two-step regression result indicates that such a dampening effect is insignificant once
we consider the endogeneity of Liquidity and include the predicted value of deposit growth.
We replace MORALHAZARD by a simple explicit/implicit deposit insurance dummy (TYPE) and ob-
tain an even weaker result: The interaction term of TYPE and Liquidity is significantly positive but its in-
teraction terms with the other bank risk measures are not significant. Our results based on a large sample
set across 60 countries are not consistent with Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2003), who obtained robust
results, using bank data across 30 countries, that explicit deposit insurance tended to reduce the risk sensi-
tivity of deposit interest rate even when they controlled for the endogeneity problems of Liquidity and de-
posit growth. We try to make our sample countries and periods identical to Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga
(2003) as much as possible? and find that the interaction terms of MORALHAZARD with the predicted
value of Liquidity as well as Liquidity and Equity are significantly positive, though the interaction term of
MORALHAZARD and Profit is positive but not significant. The difference in sample country-years seems
to be a main reason for the two different results between ours and Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2003).
??
? Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2003) do not report the countries for which they estimate the interest rate equation.
However, they report the average interest expense for 41 countries in Table 2. Therefore, we checked whether each of
the 41 countries of their list have enough data to estimate the interest rate equation, finding that 29 countries actually
had enough data. Because they use 29 or 30 countries to estimate the deposit interest rate equation in Table 3, we con-
sider that their sample countries are almost identical to the 29 countries in our dataset. Though their sample period cov-
ers the 1990-97 periods, we do not have data for 1990-91. Therefore, we restrict our sample to the 1992-97 periods.
Our observations may cover the countries where or years when deposit insurance is less credible than the
observations covered by Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2003). Deposit insurance that is not very credible
increases repudiation risk and hence does not tend to reduce market discipline.
We investigate the relationship between each deposit insurance design features that are components of
the MORALHAZARD index and the risk sensitivity of deposit interest rate (Table 6). Though OLS re-
sults show that the interaction terms of Liquidity with 7 out of 9 components are significantly positive,
the two-step regression results suggest that only 2 components, i.e., funded insurance (FUNDTYPE) and
voluntary membership (MEMBER) tend to reduce the risk sensitivity of deposit interest rate. Our OLS
regression results are roughly consistent with Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2003), who conducted only
OLS for deposit insurance design features.?
??
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Table 6 . Deposit Interest Rate, Market Discipline, and Deposit Insurance Design Features
***,**,* indicate statistical significance levels of 1,5 and 10 percent,respectively. 
Dependent variable is the ratio of interest expense to interest-paying debt, deflated by GDP 
P-values are in parentheses under the estimated coefficients, using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors
from an OLS regression. 
Design Features
Liquidity
 
Design Features
 
Liquidity x Design Features
 
No. of obs.
Adj. R-square
F value
TYPE        
-0.033
(.005)
-0.016
(.000)
0.023
(.053)
17419
0.66
383.5
***
 
***
 
*
 
 
 
***
COINSURE        
-0.019
(.010)
-0.008
(.000)
0.003
(.442)
17240
0.61
292.6
 
***
 
***
 
 
 
 
 
***
LIMIT        
-0.051
(.000)
-0.017
(.000)
0.041
(.003)
17419
0.67
418.5
***
 
***
 
***
 
 
 
***
INTERBANK        
-0.041
(.000)
-0.008
(.000)
0.026
(.002)
17240
0.61
303.2
 
***
 
***
 
***
 
 
 
***
FOREIGN        
-0.010
(.204)
0.004
(.000)
0.002
(.642)
17240
0.61
311.5
 
 
 
***
 
 
 
 
 
***
Design Features
Liquidity
 
Design Features
 
Liquidity x Design Features
 
No. of obs.
Adj. R-square
F value
FUNDTYPE        
-0.062
(.000)
-0.014
(.000)
0.033
(.000)
17240
0.62
293.4
 
***
 
***
 
***
 
 
***
FUNDSOURCE         
-0.043
(.000)
-0.013
(.000)
0.019
(.000)
17240
0.62
290.5
 
***
 
***
 
***
 
 
 
***
MANAGE        
-0.036
(.000)
-0.006
(.000)
0.014
(.000)
17240
0.61
284.2
 
***
 
***
 
***
 
 
 
***
MEMBER        
-0.024
(.001)
-0.013
(.000)
0.015
(.009)
17240
0.61
288.8
 
***
 
***
 
**
 
 
 
***
? Our OLS results show that explicit deposit insurance (TYPE), blanket guarantee (LIMIT), funded insurance (FUND-
TYPE), protection of interbank deposit (INTERBANK), government-funded insurance (FUNDSOURCE), publicly
managed insurance (MANAGE), and voluntary membership (MEMBER) tended to reduce the risk sensitivity of de-
posit interest rate, while coinsurance (COINSURE) and protection of foreign currency deposit (FOERIGN) has no sig-
nificant impact. On the other hand, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2003) also found that TYPE, LIMIT, FUNDTYPE,
INTERBANK, FUNDSOURCE, and MANAGE tended to reduce the risk sensitivity of deposit interest rate, while
COINSURE and FOERIGN tended to enhance it.
E. Supervision
We find a strong association between official supervisory power and the risk sensitivity of deposit in-
terest rate, irrespectively of the bank risk measures or the regression methods (Panel E of Table 5). A
strong supervisory power tends to reduce the risk sensitivity of deposit interest rate. We also find that
powerful supervision tends to reduce deposit interest rate. Powerful supervisory authorities seem to re-
duce the risk sensitivity of deposit interest rate either through regulatory discipline or regulatory shield.
The supervisory power index, SPOWER, is composed of prompt corrective power index (PCACT),
restructuring power index (RPOWER), and declaring insolvency power index (DINSOL). We find that
the results for RPOWER and DINSOL strongly suggest that they tend to reduce the risk sensitivity of
deposit interest rate, while the results for PCACT are mixed (not reported).
F. Accounting, disclosure, audit and ratings
We do not find a robust effect of superior disclosure and accounting on the risk sensitivity of deposit
interest rate (Panel F of Table 5). This is possibly because accurate data of bank risk is difficult to obtain
especially in a country with poor accounting and disclosure practices. It should be noted that our results
do not necessarily imply that improvement in accounting or disclosure is not important to enhance de-
positor discipline, because our results may depend on the limited availability of accurate data.
G. Government ownership of banks
The relationship between the size of government-owned banks and the risk sensitivity of deposit inter-
est rate is not robust (Panel G of Table 5). Concerning the relationship between government ownership
of banks and bank insolvency risk, Caprio and Marinez (2000) and BCL (2004) obtained inconsistent re-
sults. Caprio and Marinez (2000), using panel data, found that government ownership is significantly
and positively associated with increases in bank fragility, while BCL (2004), using cross-country data,
did not find a positive relationship between government ownership and the likelihood of a crisis. Given
these preceding studies, it is unlikely that government-owned banks are relatively safe as compared to
privately owned banks. Therefore, our results suggest two possibilities. One possibility is that govern-
ment ownership of banks does not affect bank insolvency risk. The other is that government-ownership
of banks increases insolvency risk and reduces depositors’ losses in the case of insolvency through im-
plicit deposit protection.
H. Contract Enforcement and Protection of Property Rights
We find strong evidence that strong enforcement of contract (CONTRACT), and protection of proper-
ty rights (FPROP) tend to reduce the risk sensitivity of deposit interest rate (Panels H and I of Table 5).
The interaction terms of these legal quality variables and bank risk measures are significantly positive.
We also find that a high legal quality tends to reduce the deposit interest rate level. These results are
consistent with our hypotheses that in a country with well developed legal environment, regulatory au-
thorities can control bank risk effectively and that depositors incur low restitution or verification costs in
the case of bank insolvency.
??
5.2 Robustness
We check the robustness of the baseline results for the deposit interest rate to deal with some potential
biases caused by the limitation of data availability.
First, we restrict our sample banks to commercial banks. We used for the baseline estimation all the
sample banks whose data were available. However, if the coverage of some small banks including sav-
ings banks and cooperative banks varies country by country and depositors’ risk sensitivity to bank risk
depend on bank types, our baseline results may be biased. To deal with this potential sample selection
bias, we restrict our sample banks to commercial banks, whose data are presumably easily available for
most of the countries. Table 7 reports the OLS estimation results for Liquidity as a bank risk measure,
confirming most of the baseline results. In particular, ACTREG, CAPREG, MORALHAZARD, SPOW-
??
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Table 7. Deposit Interest Rate, Market Discipline, and Institutions (Commercial bank) 
Liquidity
 
Design Features
 
 
 
 
 
Liquidity x Design Features
 
 
 
 
 
No. of obs.
Adj. R-square
F value
ACTREG        
-0.049
(.000)
-0.002
(.000)
 
 
 
 
0.006
(.000)
 
 
 
 
9559
0.74
408.0
 
***
 
***
 
 
 
 
 
***
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
***
CAPREG        
-0.049
(.008)
 
-0.001
(.285)
 
 
 
 
0.009
(.005)
 
 
 
5846
0.75
972.3
 
***
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
***
 
 
 
 
 
 
***
ENTYYREQ        
0.027
(.038)
 
 
0.0004
(.433)
 
 
 
 
-0.005
(.024)
 
 
9438
0.74
369.2
 
**
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
**
 
 
 
 
 
***
SPOWER        
-0.050
(.001)
 
 
 
 
-0.003
(.000)
 
 
 
 
0.004
(.001)
9507
0.73
507.6
 
***
 
 
 
 
 
***
 
 
 
 
 
***
 
 
 
***
MORALHAZARD         
-0.015
(.000)
 
 
 
-0.005
(.000)
 
 
 
 
0.015
(.000)
 
9880
0.68
387.6
 
***
 
 
 
 
***
 
 
 
 
 
***
 
 
 
 
***
Liquidity
 
Design Features
 
 
 
 
Liquidity x Design Features
 
 
 
 
No. of obs.
Adj. R-square
F value
PMONITOR        
-0.046
(.074)
-0.009
(.000)
 
 
 
0.006
(.140)
 
 
 
5233
0.91
1383.2
 
*
 
***
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
***
GOVBANK        
0.002
(.535)
 
0.0005
(.000)
 
 
 
-0.001
(.000)
 
 
8345
0.76
403.0
 
 
 
 
***
 
 
 
 
***
 
 
 
 
 
***
CONTRACT        
-0.089
(.000)
 
 
-0.018
(.000)
 
 
 
0.027
(.000)
 
8974
0.71
755.6
 
***
 
 
 
***
 
 
 
 
***
 
 
 
 
***
FPROP        
-0.089
(.006)
 
 
 
-0.016
(.000)
 
 
 
0.019
(.005)
9467
0.67
654.9
 
***
 
 
 
 
***
 
 
 
 
***
 
 
 
***
ER, CONTRACT, and FPROP significantly reduce the sensitivity of the deposit interest rate to Liquidi-
ty. On the other hand, the interaction terms of Liquidity with ENTREYREQ and GOVBANK are signifi-
cantly negative, while these were not significant for the whole sample banks.
Next, we restrict our sample periods to 1999-2002. As we discussed in Section 4.2, applying the regu-
latory variables as of 1999 to the whole sample period may cause a bias. Considering that most of the
crisis-hit Asian countries changed their regulatory frameworks after the crisis, applying the regulatory
variables as of 1999 to the pre-crisis period may be particularly problematic. Table 8 shows the OLS es-
timation results for Liquidity as a bank risk measure. The interaction terms of Liquidity with ACTREG,,
SPOWER, CONTRACT, and FPROP are significantly positive, as for the baseline results. The interac-
tion terms of Liquidity with CAPREG, and MORALHAZARD are positive but not significant. On the
other hand, the interaction term of Liquidity with PMONITOR is significantly negative, suggesting that
??
Table 8. Deposit Interest Rate, Market Discipline, and Institutions (1999?2002)
Liquidity
 
Design Features
 
 
 
 
 
Liquidity x Design Features
 
 
 
 
 
No. of obs.
Adj. R-square
F value
ACTREG         
-0.021
(.024)
-0.002
(.000)
 
 
 
 
0.002
(.099)
 
 
 
 
6686
0.54
396.7
 
**
 
***
 
 
 
 
 
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
***
CAPREG         
-0.039
(.165)
 
-0.002
(.072)
 
 
 
 
0.006
(.151)
 
 
 
4342
0.50
200.6
 
 
 
 
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
***
ENTYYREQ        
0.05
(.007)
 
 
0.002
(.030)
 
 
 
 
-0.007
(.005)
 
 
6645
0.54
380.4
 
***
 
 
 
**
 
 
 
 
 
***
 
 
 
 
 
***
SPOWER        
-0.029
(.021)
 
 
 
 
-0.002
(.000)
 
 
 
 
0.002
(.037)
6651
0.54
378.6
 
**
 
 
 
 
 
***
 
 
 
 
 
**
 
 
 
***
MORALHAZARD          
-0.001
(.853)
 
 
 
-0.0005
(.619)
 
 
 
 
0.001
(.807)
 
6840
0.55
523.0
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
***
Liquidity
 
Design Features
 
 
 
 
Liquidity x Design Features
 
 
 
 
No. of obs.
Adj. R-square
F value
PMONITOR         
0.092
(.003)
-0.002
(.202)
 
 
 
-0.017
(.000)
 
 
 
4021
0.85
449.1
 
***
 
 
 
 
 
 
***
 
 
 
 
 
 
***
GOVBANK         
-0.010
(.001)
 
0.0003
(.001)
 
 
 
0.0002
(.321)
 
 
5997
0.58
417.8
 
***
 
 
***
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
***
CONTRACT         
-0.075
(.000)
 
 
-0.013
(.000)
 
 
 
0.023
(.000)
 
6445
0.53
477.7
 
***
 
 
 
***
 
 
 
 
***
 
 
 
 
***
FPROP         
-0.102
(.006)
 
 
 
-0.018
(.000)
 
 
 
0.021
(.006)
6709
0.48
360.2
***
 
 
 
 
***
 
 
 
 
***
 
 
 
***
improving accounting standards and disclosure tended to enhance the sensitivity of the deposit interest
rate to bank risk after 1999.
6. Deposit growth
6.1 Theory and Estimation Methodology
Deposit interest rate may not fully adjust to reflect the expected loss of depositors for several reasons.
Park and Peristiani (1998), for example, insist that the risk premium of a risky bank does not fully reflect
its risk either because a risky bank with some market power is willing to charge a relatively low interest
rate to decrease the amount of deposits or because the regulatory authorities prohibit a risky bank from
charging an absolutely high interest rate. If deposit interest rate is not fully flexible and depositors in-
crease the supply of deposits with higher interest rates, riskier banks can attract fewer amounts of de-
posits.
In a very weak banking system, credit rationing to banks may even occur. Suppose that bank capital
suddenly drops to such a low level that the bank cannot provide depositors with a sufficiently high ex-
pected return by any deposit interest rate because raising deposit interest rate would increase an insol-
vency risk and decrease expected return to deposits. If the quantity of deposits remains constant, the de-
posit market would collapse. In such a situation, the amount of deposits may adjust to a sufficiently low
level that deposit market recovers the equilibrium. In this adjustment process, a riskier bank would lose
more deposits.
We estimate the following equation applying OLS to pooled data, which is similar to the deposit inter-
est rate equation (13).
(17)
We exclude the ratio of customer and short-term funding to total interest bearing liability (MATURITY)
from the bank fundamental variables and government bill rate (Rate) from the macroeconomic variables.
To check the robustness, we control for the endogeneity problem of Liquidity and omitted variable
problem of Inerest Rate. Specifically, we estimate equation (17) with replaced by the predicted value of
from equation (15) and the predicted value of  from following regression added:
(18)
6.2 Estimation Results
Table 9 shows the estimation results of deposit growth.? Several points are notable. First, the ex-
planatory powers of the regressors, measured by adjusted R-squares are much lower than that of deposit
interest rate regression. Second, the coefficient of Liquidity is not necessarily significantly positive. As
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2003) stresses, these inconclusive results may come from the opposing
??
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Table 9 . Deposit Growth Rate, Market Discipline, and Institutions 
***,**,* indicate statistical significance levels of 1,5 and 10 percent,respectively. 
Dependent variable is the deposit growth rate , deflated by GDP deflator. 
P-values are in parentheses under the estimated coefficients, using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors from
an OLS regression. 
A. ACTREG
Constant
 
Bank risk
 
OVERHEAD
 
ASSETSIZE
 
INFLATION
 
GROWTH
 
INTEREST RATE (Predicted value)
 
Bank risk x
ACTREG
No. of obs.
Adj. R-square
F value
Liquidity         
0.040
(.000)
-0.034
(.126)
0.132
(.478)
0.002
(.000)
-0.138
(.000)
0.891
(.000)
 
 
0.003
(.196)
18986
0.03
40.0
***
 
 
 
 
 
***
 
***
 
***
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
***
Profit           
0.011
(.130)
0.621
(.001)
-0.001
(.996)
0.002
(.000)
-0.135
(.000)
0.903
(.000)
 
 
-0.053
(.010)
19506
0.03
45.3
 
 
***
 
 
 
***
 
***
 
***
 
 
 
***
 
 
 
***
Equity           
0.040
(.000)
-0.064
(.075)
0.129
(.484)
0.002
(.000)
-0.145
(.000)
0.871
(.000)
 
 
0.012
(.017)
19505
0.03
43.7
***
 
*
 
 
 
***
 
***
 
***
 
 
 
**
 
 
 
***
Predicted value          
of Liquidity           
-0.004
(.885)
-0.057
(.731)
0.392
(.002)
0.002
(.000)
0.581
(.000)
1.110
(.000)
0.821
(.000)
0.003
(.872)
6662
0.03
19.6
 
 
 
 
***
 
***
 
***
 
***
 
***
 
 
 
 
 
*** 
B. CAPREG 
 
Bank risk
 
CAPREG
 
Bank risk x
CAPREG
No. of obs.
Adj. R-square
F value
Liquidity         
-0.063
(.248)
-0.004
(.068)
0.006
(.446)
12009
0.02
21.0
 
 
***
 
 
 
 
 
***
Profit           
-0.828
(.004)
-0.009
(.000)
0.130
(.002)
12068
0.02
26.0
***
 
***
 
***
 
 
 
***
Equity           
-0.104
(.321)
-0.005
(.010)
0.026
(.106)
12068
0.02
22.4
 
 
***
 
 
 
 
 
***
Predicted value          
of Liquidity           
-0.640
(.000)
-0.022
(.003)
0.107
(.000)
3580
0.05
16.2
***
 
***
 
***
 
 
 
***
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***,**,* indicate statistical significance levels of 1,5 and 10 percent,respectively. 
Dependent variable is the deposit growth rate , deflated by GDP deflator. 
P-values are in parentheses under the estimated coefficients, using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors from
an OLS regression. 
C. ENTRYREQ 
 
Bank risk
 
ENTRYREQ
 
Bank risk x
ENTRYREQ
No. of obs.
Adj. R-square
F value
Liquidity         
0.035
(.423)
0.003
(.057)
-0.007
(.279)
18859
0.03
37.1
 
 
*
 
 
 
 
 
***
Profit           
0.106
(.883)
0.002
(.594)
-0.014
(.856)
19379
0.03
40.0
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
***
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
***
Equity           
-0.036
(.669)
0.0004
(.792)
0.008
(.548)
19379
0.03
39.3
Predicted value          
of Liquidity           
0.185
(.572)
0.008
(.406)
-0.031
(.495)
6606
0.03
19.3
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
***
D. MORALHAZARD 
 
Bank risk
 
MORALHAZARD
 
Bank risk x
MORALHAZARD
No. of obs.
Adj. R-square
F value
Liquidity         
-0.020
(.015)
-0.004
(.002)
0.009
(.064)
19406
0.03
42.6
**
 
***
 
*
 
 
 
***
Profit           
0.261
(.034)
0.003
(.131)
-0.108
(.011)
19921
0.03
46.1
**
 
 
 
**
 
 
 
***
 
 
***
 
**
 
 
 
***
Equity           
-0.010
(.521)
-0.004
(.002)
0.023
(.040)
19919
0.03
45.5
Predicted value          
of Liquidity           
-0.050
(.225)
-0.009
(.012)
0.045
(.003)
6894
0.04
26.6
 
 
**
 
***
 
 
 
***
E. SPOWER 
 
Bank risk
 
SPOWER
 
Bank risk x
SPOWER
No. of obs.
Adj. R-square
F value
Liquidity         
0.076
(.010)
0.002
(.009)
-0.008
(.003)
18872
0.03
42.4
***
 
***
 
***
 
 
 
***
Profit           
0.979
(.001)
0.004
(.022)
-0.073
(.034)
19392
0.03
49.5
***
 
**
 
**
 
 
 
***
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
***
Equity           
0.045
(.547)
0.001
(.242)
-0.004
(.563)
19391
0.03
44.9
Predicted value          
of Liquidity           
0.552
(.009)
0.012
(.000)
-0.05
(.005)
6662
0.04
22.5
***
 
***
 
***
 
 
 
***
??
F. PMONITOR 
 
Bank risk
 
PMONITOR
 
Bank risk x
PMONITOR
No. of obs.
Adj. R-square
F value
Liquidity         
0.073
(.415)
-0.010
(.005)
-0.017
(.213)
11105
0.02
22.0
 
 
***
 
 
 
 
 
***
Profit           
0.851
(.241)
-0.005
(.479)
-0.123
(.308)
11155
0.02
20.3
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
***
**
 
 
 
*
 
 
 
***
Equity           
0.422
(.034)
-0.006
(.124)
-0.061
(.056)
11155
0.02
21.1
Predicted value          
of Liquidity           
0.348
(.346)
0.002
(.882)
-0.062
(.278)
3723
0.04
15.0
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
***
G. GOVBANK 
 
Bank risk
 
CAPREG
 
Bank risk x
CAPREG
No. of obs.
F value
Liquidity         
-0.033
(.000)
0.001
0.000
-0.00001
0.990
16613
38.7
***
 
***
 
 
 
 
***
Profit           
-0.004
(.992)
0.001
0.100
-0.002
0.791
17120
39.4
 
 
*
 
 
 
 
***
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
***
Equity           
0.039
(.254)
0.001
0.000
-0.001
0.191
17119
39.5
Predicted value          
of Liquidity           
-0.105
(.050)
0.0003
0.602
0.0003
0.896
5808
20.5
**
 
 
 
 
 
 
***
H. CONTRACT 
 
Bank risk
 
CAPREG
 
Bank risk x
CAPREG
No. of obs.
Adj. R-square
F value
Liquidity         
0.161
(.000)
-0.0002
(.958)
-0.056
(.000)
17436
0.02
34.5
***
 
 
 
***
 
 
 
***
Profit           
1.099
(.000)
0.005
(.470)
-0.323
(.005)
17956
0.03
39.5
***
 
 
 
***
 
 
 
***
***
 
 
 
***
 
 
 
***
Equity           
0.218
(.010)
-0.004
(.291)
-0.079
(.007)
17955
0.02
34.8
Predicted value          
of Liquidity           
0.333
(.060)
0.036
(.006)
-0.139
(.038)
6567
0.03
18.3
*
 
***
 
**
 
 
 
***
managerial incentives: Managers of a risky bank may be willing to attract additional deposits to make a
gamble on one hand, while they may be willing to shrink deposits and assets to avoid failure or be
forced to decrease assets to meet capital adequacy requirements.
Looking at the coefficients of the interaction terms between bank risk measures and regulation vari-
ables, we find no robust evidence except for SPOWER. The interaction terms of SPOWER and the bank
risk measures are significantly negative, except for the case of Equity, suggesting that SPOWER tends to
reduce the risk sensitivity of deposit growth. This is consistent with the estimation results of the deposit
interest rate. Most of the interaction terms of bank risk measures and the other bank regulation variables
are either insignificant or mixed depending on risk measures.
We also find strong evidence that strong contract enforcement (CONTRACT) and protection of prop-
erty right (FPROP) are likely to reduce the risk sensitivity of deposit growth rate, which is again consis-
tent with the results for deposit interest rate.
7. Conclusion
We find strong evidence that strict regulations on bank activities and powerful supervisory authorities
tend to decrease the deposit interest rate and its sensitivity to bank risk, suggesting that these regulations
and supervisions reduce market discipline on banks by depositors. We also find that explicit deposit in-
surance that is funded or whose membership is voluntary tend to lower market discipline. The evidence
on the effects of a strict capital regulation, a severe entry requirement and a large presence of govern-
ment-owned banks on market discipline are mixed, depending on the measure of bank risk and the esti-
mation method. In addition to these bank regulation indexes, we investigated general legal qualities and
found that a higher legal quality tends to reduce deposit interest rate and market discipline, suggesting
that countries in a well developed legal system tends to effectively control bank risk or to reduce deposi-
tors’ restitution or verification costs.
??
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***,**,* indicate statistical significance levels of 1,5 and 10 percent,respectively. 
Dependent variable is the deposit growth rate , deflated by GDP deflator. 
P-values are in parentheses under the estimated coefficients, using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors from
an OLS regression. 
I. FPROP 
 
Bank risk
 
CAPREG
 
Bank risk x
CAPREG
No. of obs.
Adj. R-square
F value
Liquidity         
0.259
(.000)
-0.004
(.169)
-0.059
(.000)
19166
0.03
47.2
***
 
 
 
***
 
 
 
***
Profit           
1.198
(.000)
-0.004
(.361)
-0.247
(.005)
19686
0.03
49.8
***
 
 
 
***
 
 
 
***
***
 
***
 
***
 
 
 
***
Equity           
0.348
(.000)
-0.010
(.001)
-0.083
(.000)
19684
0.03
45.5
Predicted value          
of Liquidity           
0.485
(.010)
0.026
(.016)
-0.128
(.004)
6809
0.04
21.3
***
 
**
 
***
 
 
 
***
Our results on the risk sensitivity of deposit growth are relatively poor in the sense that the explanato-
ry powers of the regressors are much lower than that of the deposit interest rate regression. We find evi-
dence that strong supervisory power and higher legal quality tend to reduce the risk sensitivity of deposit
growth, which is consistent with the results for the deposit interest rate.
Our results suggest that strict regulations on bank activities and powerful supervisory authorities lead
to lower required interest rates at a cost of lower market discipline. Whether strict regulations on bank
activities help to prevent bank failures and contribute to prudent bank behaviors (“regulatory discipline”)
or tend to be associated with generous bailouts of insolvent banks (“regulatory shield”) is an important
issue to be explored in the future.
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